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Preferred Communications, Inc. v. Los
Angeles: Broadening Cable's First
Amendment Rights and Narrowing
Cities' Franchising Powers
by D. SCOTT SHAFFER*
I
Introduction
Since its advent, cable television has confused the legisla-
tures, courts, and commentators who have grappled with the
question of how to regulate the medium. One reason for this
confusion is that cable is evolving as new technology is intro-
duced and operators offer new services. At no time is this con-
fusion more evident than when cable regulations are
challenged, and courts must decide which first amendment reg-
ulatory model to apply-that of print, broadcast, or some hy-
brid of both.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and
the United States Supreme Court again puzzled over which
first amendment model to apply to cable in Preferred Commu-
nications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles.' The Ninth Circuit's
opinion, however, is unique because it is the first to impliedly
use a print model to hold that the free speech clause of the first
amendment prohibits government from excluding prospective
cable operators from a given geographic region where there is
physical room to place cable on public rights-of-way.2 The
Supreme Court's decision, while affirming that the first amend-
ment is plainly implicated, disappointingly declined to affirm
the Ninth Circuit's use of the first amendment print model.
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), [hereinafter Preferred 1] affid and remanded, -
U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986) [hereinafter Preferred III.
2. "Public rights-of-way" will be used throughout this commentary to refer to
publicly owned facilities, land, and easements-typically utility poles and under-
ground conduits.
3. Preferred II, 106 S. Ct. at 2037, 2038.
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Preferred Communications, a prospective cable operator, ini-
tially filed suit in the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California alleging, inter alia, that Los Angeles'
franchising process violated its first amendment rights by deny-
ing it a cable franchise.4 The district court found as a matter of
law that the city's franchising process did not violate those
rights.5 Preferred appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of Preferred's first amendment
claims.6 The City of Los Angeles then appealed. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit,7 but on
grounds narrower than those relied on by the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court simply stated that "the activities in which
[Preferred] allegedly seeks to engage plainly implicate First
Amendment interests, '8 and therefore stopped short of endors-
ing any particular first amendment model. Rather than adopt-
ing the print model relied on by the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court left "open the question of the proper standard for judg-
ing First Amendment challenges to a municipality's restriction
of access to cable facilities [i.e., the public rights-of-way]." 9 Jus-
tice Rehnquist, for a unanimous court, wrote:
Ordinarily such a motion [to dismiss for failure to state a claim
on which relief could be granted] frames a legal issue such as
the one which the Court of Appeals undertook to decide in this
case. But this case is different from a case between private liti-
gants for two reasons: first, it is an action of a municipal corpo-
ration taken pursuant to a city ordinance that is challenged
here, and, second, the ordinance is challenged on colorable
First Amendment grounds. The City has adduced essentially
factual arguments to justify the restrictions on cable franchis-
ing imposed by its ordinance, but the factual assertions of the
City are disputed at least in part by [Preferred]. We are un-
willing to decide the legal questions posed by the parties with-
out a more thoroughly developed record of proceedings in
which the parties have an opportunity to prove those disputed
4. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1401. Preferred also alleged a violation of rights pro-
tected under the fourteenth amendment and the federal antitrust laws. Id. Because
this note focuses on the first amendment issue, the fourteenth amendment and anti-
trust issues are beyond its scope.
5. Preferred 1, 754 F.2d at 1399.
6. Id.
7. Preferred II, 106 S. Ct. at 2036.
8. Id. at 2037.
9. Id. at 2038 (Blackmun, Marshall, & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
[Vol. 8
PREFERRED COMMUNICATIONS
factual assertions upon which they rely.' °
Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case,1' con-
cluding, "[w]e think that we may know more than we know
now about how the constitutional issues should be resolved
when we know more about the present uses of the public utility
poles and rights-of-way and how [Preferred] proposes to install
and maintain its facilities on them.
1 2
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's unwillingness to de-
cide the legal questions without further fact finding, this com-
mentary analyzes the Ninth Circuit's first amendment opinion
in the belief that resolving the disputed factual assertions is not
necessary to determine the proper first amendment standard
for cable. This commentary will first review the developmen-
tal and regulatory history of cable and discuss the background
of the Preferred case. Then, after analyzing the soundness of
the Ninth Circuit's opinion, this commentary will explore the
probable impact the Ninth Circuit's decision will have on access
channel requirements, franchise fees, franchise renewals, and
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 if the Supreme
Court eventually adopts the regulatory model relied on by the
Ninth Circuit.
II
The Development of Cable Regulation
Cable began as an antenna system in the 1950s, receiving lo-
cal television broadcast signals over the air and retransmitting
them via cable to homes which, because of geographic terrain,
would otherwise receive inadequate reception. 3 By simply re-
10. Id. at 2037. The disputed factual assertions focused on the aesthetics of cable
strung on utility poles and on the disruption of the public domain that occurs when a
cable system is installed or repaired:
The City also characterizes [the stringing of cable on utility poles] as "a per-
manent visual blight" ... and adds that the process of installation and repair
of such a system in effect subjects City facilities designed for other purposes
to a servitude which will cause traffic delays and hazards and esthetic un-
sightliness. [Preferred] in its turn replies that the City does not "provide
anything more than speculations and assumptions," and that the City's "legit-
imate concerns are easily satisfied without the need to limit the right to
speak to a single speaker."
Id.
11. Id. at 2038.
12. Id.
13. G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND & J. MERCURIO, 'CABLESPEECH,' THE CASE FOR
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 1 (1983) [hereinafter CABLESPEECH].
No. 3/4]
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transmitting the broadcast signals, however, cable operators ex-
ercised little editorial discretion and created little of their own
programming.14 But as the systems' channel capacities grew,
cable operators began to import and retransmit distant televi-
sion signals.15 In the late 1960's and early 1970's, videotape re-
cording technology improved and recording costs decreased.
16
Soon thereafter many cable operators began producing their
own programming. 7 Then, with what was probably the single
greatest catalyst to the medium's growth, cable started import-
ing signals via satellite in September, 1975.18 Services now ex-
isting in experimental stages include one-way videotex 9 and
two-way teletext,20 alarm and security services, meter reading,
and data transmission.21
In addition to technological changes, the medium was under-
going regulatory changes. Until 1962, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC or Commission) refused to regulate
cable,22 asserting that it did not have jurisdiction to do so under
the Communications Act of 1934.23 In 1962, however, the FCC
14. Goldberg, Ross & Spector, Cable Television, Government Regulation, and the
First Amendment, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 577, 578 (1981).
15. CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at 2.
16. Id. In addition to videotape recording technology, playback equipment and
other video production equipment technology also improved while costs decreased.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at n.3 (citing Barrington, Pay TV: Now A Staple on the Cable 'Menu', in 2
THE CABLE/BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS BOOK 1980-1981 141-42 (M. Hallowell ed.
1980)) (Home Box Office, Inc. was the first to provide satellite-delivered
programming.).
19. An example of one-way videotex is the transmission of newspapers over cable.
Such transmission can originate either with the cable operator or with a television
station. Television stations send the text on a portion of the main signal which is
displayed on the vertical blanking interval. A television set normally displays its pic-
ture with an electron gun which shoots images onto the picture tube line by line.
When the gun reaches the end of one line it turns off while it returns to the beginning
of the next line. It is this "off" period which is the vertical blanking interval. See
Goldberg, Ross & Spector, supra note 14, at 579 n.6.
20. Examples of two-way teletext are home banking, catalog shopping, and voting
where subscribers not only receive but send information such as a request for a check-
ing balance, an order for merchandise, or a vote. See CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at
3.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Malrite TV of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1143 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied 454 U.S. 1143 (1982). See also CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at 15; M. FRANKLIN,
MASS MEDIA LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 634 (2d ed. 1982).
23. See Malrite TV of New York v. FCC, supra note 22, at 1143-44. The Communi-
cations Act is currently codified at 47 US.C. §§ 151-611 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The
original act was codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1982).
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asserted jurisdiction to prohibit a common carrier from con-
structing microwave facilities to transmit broadcast signals to a
cable system unless the system carried local broadcast signals.24
The Commission thereby indirectly created the predecessor of
the "must-carry" rules.25 The decision was formalized into a
rule in 1965 and was extended to all cable systems in 1966.26
The must-carry rules required cable operators to carry, on re-
quest by broadcasters and without compensation, every local
over-the-air television broadcast signal that was "significantly
viewed in the community. '27  Fearing that importing distant
24. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, para. 17 at 465 (1962),
affd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). See also CABLESPEECH,
supra note 13, at 138-39.
25. CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at 138-39.
26. CATV, Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) (modifying Rules re
Microwave-Served CATV, First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965)). See also
CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at 138-39. Whether the FCC's aggressive posture vis-a-
vis cable was the result of effective lobbying by broadcasters or the result of the Com-
mission's fear that cable would harm broadcasters by siphoning away viewers, the
must-carry rules signaled the beginning of numerous regulations restricting cable.
27. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-61 (1985). The must-carry rules were recently held uncon-
stitutional in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied sub nom. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., - U.S. -,
106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986), on grounds very similar to those used by the Ninth Circuit in
Preferred I. The Quincy court reasoned that "[u]nlike ordinary broadcast television,
which transmits the video image over airwaves capable of bearing only a limited
number of signals, cable reaches the home over a coaxial cable with the technological
capacity to carry 200 or more channels." Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1448. Therefore,
[tihe First Amendment theory espoused in National Broadcasting Co. and
reaffirmed in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. [which is used to support broad
regulation of broadcasters] cannot be directly applied to cable television since
an essential precondition of that theory-physical interference and scarcity
requiring an umpiring role for government - is absent.
quoted in Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1449 (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,
45 (D.C. Cir), cert denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)). The Quincy court then stated that
cable television shares attributes of the more traditional press does not, of
course, suggest that the First Amendment interposes an impermeable bul-
wark against any regulation. As the Home Box Office court observed, for
cable, no less than for other media, the First Amendment draws a distinction
between "incidental" burdens on speech-regulations that evince a govern-
mental interest unrelated to the suppression or protection of a particular set
of ideas-and restrictions that are "intended to curtail expression--either di-
rectly by banning speech because of ... its communicative or persuasive ef-
fect on its intended audience ... or indirectly by favoring certain classes of
speakers over others ......
Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1450 (quoting Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 47-48). However, the
Quincy court held that the must-carry rules were not simply incidental burdens on
speech but that "the must-carry rules, as currently drafted, represent a 'fatally over-
broad response' to the perceived fear that cable will displace free, local, television."
Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1459 (quoting FEC v. National Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 498, 105 S. Ct. 1459, 1470 (1985). The court noted that "[a]lthough the goal of the
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signals into the largest 100 television markets might "destroy
or seriously degrade the service offered by a television broad-
caster,'28 the FCC severely restricted cable operators' ability to
import distant signals by requiring them to show, in an eviden-
tiary hearing, that the importation would be in the public inter-
est and would not harm UHF broadcast services.29 In 1968, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the FCC's regulation of
cable as "reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's duty to reg-
ulate television broadcasting.30 During the following year, the
FCC extended the fairness doctrine 31 and the equal time re-
quirements32 from broadcast to cable,33 and required larger
cable systems to originate their own programming.34 In 1972,
the FCC imposed new channel capacity and access require-
ments35 and adopted federal franchise standards that pre-
[mustcarry] rules-preserving local broadcasting-can be viewed as unrelated to the
suppression or protection of any particular set of ideas, the rules nonetheless pro-
foundly affect values that lie near the heart of the First Amendment. They favor one
group of speakers over another." Id. at 1453. Therefore, the must-carry rules in their
current form violate cable operators' first amendment rights "[b]ecause 'the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of [our] society in order to
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.' " Id.
at 1452 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)).
28. Rules re Microwave-served CATV, First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683,
para. 48 at 700 (1965).
29. Malrite TV of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d at 1144. See also M. FRANKLIN,
supra note 22, at 634-35. UHF, the acronym for Ultra High Frequency, refers to
broadcast channels above channel 13. UHF is to be distinguished from VHF, the acro-
nym for Very High Frequency, which refers to broadcast channels 2 through 13. Be-
cause home television sets generally did not receive UHF stations as well as VHF
stations, UHF stations struggled economically. Thus, by requiring cable operators to
show that importing distant signals, which the FCC believed would siphon viewers
from local stations and thus decrease advertising revenues, would not harm UHF sta-
tions, the FCC virtually assured that no distant signals would be imported. See
Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1441.
30. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). See also
Malrite TV of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d at 1144; M. FRANKLIN, supra note 22, at 634;
Goldberg, Ross & Specter, supra note 14, at 578.
31. The "fairness doctrine," promulgated by the FCC, requires broadcasters to
devote time to discussing matters of public importance and to present opposing view-
points. See Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding constitutionality of the
fairness doctrine).
32. The "equal time" provision of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (1982), gives a broadcaster discretion to provide time to a candidate for public
office. However, once the broadcaster provides time to one candidate, the broadcaster
must give other candidates for the same office equal opportunities to use the station.
33. CATV, First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, para. 39 at 218-19 (1969).
34. Id., paras. 48-49 & app. at 222-23.
35. "The FCC required all new cable systems being built in major markets to con-
struct a minimum 20 channel capacity with two-way transmission capacity. Existing
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empted most state and local access channel requirements.36
Soon after, however, a regulatory retreat began.
Recognizing that many regulations were, as described by
Judge Newman of the Second Circuit, "hostile to the growth of
the cable industry,"37 the FCC began taking steps to lessen the
burden on cable operators.38 In 1975, the Commission author-
ized domestic satellites to transmit programming to cable sys-
tems,39  eventually resulting in the emergence of
"superstations."4 The FCC also abandoned its program origi-
nation requirements41 after finding that "marketplace forces
... will obtain increases in supply far more certainly than ad-
systems were required to upgrade their facilities to meet these standards by 1977."
CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at 16 n.49 (citing Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 143 (1972), modified, Major Market Cable Television Systems, Report and
Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 207 (1975), further modified, Cable TV Capacity and Access Re-
quirements, Report and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976)). The access requirements re-
quired that cable operators provide public access to their systems free of charge via
channels called "access channels." Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d
143, paras. 117-48 at 189-98.
36. The new standards that the FCC adopted
required local franchising authorities (1) to consider the legal, character, fi-
nancial, technical and other qualifications of franchise applicants and the ad-
equacy of their construction proposals; (2) to issue franchises in public
proceedings affording due process; and (3) to require early implementation
and completion of construction, a fifteen-year limit on franchise duration,
rate regulation for basic services, a resolution mechanism for subscriber com-
plaints, automatic franchise incorporation of changes in the FCC's franchise
standards, and limits on franchise fees.
CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at 16 n.50 (citing Cable Television, Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 143, paras. 178-87 at 207-10 (1972)).
37. Malrite TV of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1144 (2d Cir. 1981).
38. Id.
39. Florida Cablevision, Order and Authorization, 54 F.C.C.2d 881, para. 10 at 883,
(1975); CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at 18 & n.57.
40. "Superstations" are independent television stations whose programming is
transmitted up to a satellite, then retransmitted to cable systems across the nation
which send the signal, via cable, to subscribers' homes. See CABLE TV RENEWALS &
REFRANCHINSING 205 (J. Rice ed. 1983) [hereinafter CABLE TV RENEWALS].
41. The FCC defined "program origination"
as something more than the origination of automated services (such as time
and weather, news ticker, stock ticker, etc.) and aural services (such as music
and announcements).... [It] in essence necessitates that the CATV operator
have some kind of video cablecasting system for the production of local live
and delayed programming (e.g., a camera and a video tape recorder, etc.)....
However,... we do not mean to suggest that origination to a significant ex-
tent could not also include films and tapes produced by authors, and CATV
network programming.
CATV, First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, para. 29 at 214 (1969) (footnote
omitted).
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ministrative rules."42 And in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. ,'3 the
United States Supreme Court held that the FCC had no statu-
tory authority under the Communications Act of 1934 to re-
quire access channels.44 The deregulation trend continued in
1981 when the FCC eliminated the distant signal rules and the
program exclusivity rules.45 In 1984, Congress amended the
Communications Act of 1934 by passing the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984 (CCPA).46 The CCPA gave municipali-
ties, among other things, the statutory authority to require
access channels. 47  Although the CCPA established national
standards for franchising agreements on local and state levels, 48
it effectively made municipalities the primary regulators of
cable.
While apparently not the first case to challenge municipal
franchise requirements,49 Preferred Communications, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles is the first case in which a court was con-
42. Inquiry Into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and
Cable Television, Report, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, para. 56 at 652 (1979). See also CABLE-
SPEECH, supra note 13, at 17 & n.51.
43. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
44. Id. at 708.
45. CATV Syndicated Program Exclus. Rules, Report and Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663
para. 333 at 815 (1980), affd sub nom. Malrite TV of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982). See also CABLESPEECH, supra note 13,
at 17-18; M. FRANKLIN, supra note 22, at 635-36. The "distant signal" rules limited,
according to the market size and the number of local signals, the number of distant
signals that a cable operator could retransmit. Malrite, 652 F.2d at 1144. The "syndi-
cated program exclusivity" restrictions empowered local television stations who had
purchased syndicated programming (programming supplied by independent produ-
cers, consisting of old network and newly produced programs) to demand that local
cable operators delete that same programming from distant signals the operators
were importing. The local television station could, in some cases, make the demand
regardless of whether or not it intended to air the program simultaneously, or, indeed,
ever. Id. at 1143 n.1, 1145 & n.5.
46. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-59 (Supp. III 1985). The Act also affected provisions of titles
15, 18, 46 & 50, as well as other sections of title 47.
47. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. III 1985). The CCPA provided the statutory authority
that Midwest Video found lacking in the 1934 Act. See supra notes 43 & 44 and ac-
companying text.
48. The Act provides in pertinent part that:
The purposes of this subchapter title are to-
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards .... ;
(3) establish guidelines for for the exercise of Federal, State and local au-
thority with respect to the regulation of cable systems ....
47 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. III 1985).
49. It may seem odd that cable operators did not sooner challenge specific regula-
tions as violating their first amendment rights, particularly in light of how closely
regulated cable has been since its inception. The explanation may ironically come
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vinced that cable operators have first amendment rights more
protective than those covering broadcasters and on par with
those protecting the press.50  To understand why the Ninth
Circuit extended cable's first amendment rights, a review of
the background leading up to the decision is necessary.
III
Background of the Case
For a cable operator to reach subscribers, he must string
cable on city-owned utility poles and lay cable through under-
ground conduits.5' In exchange for a license (franchise) to use
these public rights-of-way, most cities extract agreements im-
posing maximum subscriber rates, franchise fees, service areas,
minimum number of channels, minimum local signal carriage
requirements, and access channel requirements.5 2  These
franchises are, with few exceptions, either explicitly exclusive
or de facto exclusive 53 and are granted through an auction
process.
54
The City of Los Angeles conducted such an auction where
competing cable firms were invited to bid for the privilege to
provide cable service to an area of Los Angeles described by the
city as the South Central District. Preferred Communications,
a corporation formed to provide such service, did not partici-
pate in this auction. Preferred had approached two public utili-
ties, Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company and the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power, to lease space on
those companies' poles and conduits. The utilities informed
precisely from the fact that cable has been closely regulated since its birth; operators
simply accepted overly burdensome regulation as a cost of doing business.
50. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1410 n.10. Preferred I was decided four months before
Quincy. See supra note 27.
51. Theoretically, a cable operator could purchase easements from private resi-
dents on which he could place his cable and avoid dealing with city government. Prac-
tically, however, it would be impossible to obtain the thousands of authorizations that
would be needed to construct a cable system in this manner.
52. Miller & Beals, Regulating Cable Television, 57 WASH. L. REV. 85, 89 n.23
(1981) reprinted in 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 607, 612 n.23 (1981). See infra note 86 and
accompanying text for Los Angeles' requirements.
53. See Stanzler, Cable Television Monopoly and the First Amendment, 4 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 199 & n.3 (1983). In other words, the usual agreement will explicitly
state that no other cable operators will be granted a franchise, or, if an exclusive
franchise is not explicitly granted, the municipality will simply thereafter refuse to
grant additional franchises. Id.
54. See, e.g., Preferred I, 754 F. 2d at 1400.
No. 3/4]
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Preferred that it would first have to obtain a cable television
franchise from the city. Preferred approached the city for such
a franchise but was refused because it had not participated in
the auction.55 This, in turn, led Preferred to commence the liti-
gation at hand.
IV
Analysis of the Ninth Circuit's Opinion
The Ninth Circuit identified the first amendment issue as
follows:
Can the City, consistent with the First Amendment, limit ac-
cess by means of an auction process to a given region of the
City to a single cable television company, when the public util-
ity facilities and other public property in that region necessary
to the installation and operation of a cable television system
are physically capable of accommodating more than one
system?
56
The court began its analysis by stating that it is clear that
cable television enjoys some level of first amendment protec-
tion. In support, the court cited four cases that stated either
explicitly or implicitly that cable operators engage in first
amendment speech by originating and selectively retransmit-
ting programming. 8 This was, in fact, the narrow basis on
which the Supreme Court affirmed Preferred.5 9 However, the
55. Id. at 1400, 1401.
56. Id. at 1401.
57. Id. at 1403.
58. Id. (citing Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-
29 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[The cable operator] is engaged in the dissemination of speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment, both by transmitting programs
originated by television stations and cable television networks and by originating its
own modest programs." 694 F.2d at 127); Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1376 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982)
("Cable operators, like publishers and wireless broadcasters, are entitled to First
Amendment protection."); Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1052-57 (8th
Cir. 1978), affd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) ("Cablecasting is communicat-
ing, requiring thorough and penetrating consideration of the communicator's First
Amendment rights." 571 F.2d at 1054); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 43-51
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 829 (1977) (FCC anti-siphoning rules restricting
pay cable advertising during a program, restricting to 90% the proportion of hours pay
cable could devote to feature films and sports events, and prohibiting the exhibition of
feature films more than three but less than ten years old and nonspecific sports
events not broadcast in the preceding five years violated cable operators' first amend-
ment rights.).
59. Preferred II, - U.S. at -, -, 106 S. Ct. at 2037, 2038 ("We do think that the
activities in which [Preferred] allegedly seeks to engage plainly implicate First
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key question, and the subject of this commentary, was left un-
answered. Until the lower court resolves the factual assertions
of the parties, the Supreme Court will not determine the appro-
priate regulatory model that should be applied to cable. That
is, should cable receive first amendment protection equivalent
to that protecting the print media, that protecting the broadcast
media, or something falling in between? The Ninth Circuit not
only answered this question, but its opinion reveals that it is
not necessary to resolve the factual assertions to determine the
proper first amendment standard for cable. In its next step to-
ward determining the proper first amendment standard for
cable, the Ninth Circuit compared cable television and
broadcasting.
A. Cable Television and Broadcasting Distinguished
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the first amendment per-
mits regulations that impinge on the editorial freedom of
broadcasters more than that of "other, more traditional me-
dia."60 Moreover, the court acknowledged that other courts
have, to a varying extent, applied broadcasting standards to
cable.6' Nevertheless, it declined to follow these other deci-
sions asserting that "significant differences between the two
Amendment interests.... We do not think, however, that it is desirable to express any
more detailed views on the proper resolution of the First Amendment question raised
by [Preferred's] complaint and the City's responses to it without a fuller development
of the disputed issues in the case.").
60. Preferred 1, 754 F.2d at 1403 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 386 (1969) ("Although broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First
Amendment interest, differences in the characteristics of new media justify differ-
ences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.") and National Broadcast-
ing Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943) (holding that the FCC's
regulations requiring broadcast licensing do not violate the first amendment's prohibi-
tion against regulating free speech)).
61. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1403 (citing Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1375-80 (10th Cir. 1981) (equating cable's economic scarcity due
to alleged natural monopolistic traits to broadcasting's radiowave scarcity as a basis
for regulation); Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968) ("It is
irrelevant to the Congressional power that the CATV systems do not themselves use
the air waves in their distribution systems. The crucial consideration is that they do
use radio signals [by retransmitting off-the-air broadcast signals via microwave from
the cable system's receiving antenna to the central point from which the program-
ming is distributed via cable] and that they have a unique impact upon, and relation-
ship with, the television broadcast service."); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v.
Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 983-88 (D.R.I. 1983) (equating cable's "medium" and eco-
nomic scarcity to broadcasting's radiowave scarcity)).
COMM/ENT L. J.
media" warrant different first amendment treatment.62 The
court then examined the differences between cable television
and broadcasting.
1. Medium Scarcity
The Ninth Circuit noted that broadcasting regulation is based
on the physical scarcity of radiowaves, and that without regula-
tion, competing users of the same frequency would render the
broadcast spectrum "virtually useless to all."63 This scarcity ra-
tionale was established in National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States64 by Justice Frankfurter: "Unlike other modes of ex-
pression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its
unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of
expression, it is subject to governmental regulation."65 The ra-
tionale was further clarified in Red Lion v. FCC
When two people converse face to face, both should not speak
at once if either is to be clearly understood. But the range of
the human voice is so limited that there could be meaningful
communications if half the people in the United States were
talking and the other half listening. Just as clearly, half the
people might publish and the other half read. But the reach of
radio signals is incomparably greater than the range of the
human voice and the problem of interference is a massive
reality.66
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the scarcity of radiowaves and
frequency interference necessary to support broadcast regula-
tion are absent in cable transmission, and thus the basis for
broadcast regulation cannot support cable regulation.67 The in-
62. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1403.
63. Id. at 1404.
64. 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (5-2 decision).
65. Id. at 226.
66. 395 U.S. 367, 387-88 (1969). The scarity rationale, however, has recently been
criticized. See, e.g., Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1458-59 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fowler &
Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Braodcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-
26 (1982).
67. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1403-04. The Ninth Circuit specifically based its con-
clusion on the following:
(1) Blackhills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968) is the only case to
directly apply the radiowave scarcity rationale to cable, but cable technology has
changed significantly since 1968;
(2) physical interference and scarcity of radiowaves, the two preconditions for reg-
ulating broadcast, are absent from cable; and
(3) Preferred alleged that there was space available on the utility poles and con-
duits whereas Los Angeles made only a general allegation that space was to an unde-
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applicability of the scarcity rationale to cable has not been uni-
versally accepted, however. At least one other court of appeals
has recognized that the limited space available for cable on util-
ity poles and in conduits, that is, "medium scarcity," is analo-
gous to radiowave scarcity and therefore can support some
degree of cable regulation.6 Notwithstanding this analogy, the
medium scarcity argument breaks down for at least two rea-
sons, as explained below.
First, scarcity in the medium does not exist as it does in the
radiowave spectrum. Because the typical coaxial cable is less
than one inch in diameter 69 and can be strung on utility poles
and buried in conduits, more cables may be deployed than cable
operators will need, whereas more frequencies cannot be con-
structed to meet prospective broadcasters' demand.70 This fact
termined extent physically limited without alleging that its utility poles and conduits
were so limited.
The Ninth Circuit's rationale was followed in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768
F.2d 1434, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. National Association of Broad-
casters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986). ("The First Amend-
ment theory espoused in National Broadcasting Co. and reaffirmed in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. cannot be directly applied to cable television since an essential pre-
condition of that theory-physical interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring
role for government-is absent.") (citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC 567 F.2d at 45;
Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d at 1404; Omega Satel-
lite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th Cir. 1982)).
68. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370,
1378-79 (10th Cir. 1981) ("A ... basis for government regulation of cable . . . is 'me-
dium scarcity.' More specifically ... there are physical and economic limitations on
the number of cable systems that can practicably operate in a given geographic area.
In physical terms, [there is] a sheer limit on the number of cables that can be strung
on existing telephone poles .... Inherent limitations on the number of speakers who
can use a medium to communicate has been given as a primary reason why extensive
regulation of wireless broadcasting is constitutionally permissible. When such limita-
tions exist, and the medium requires use of a limited and valuable part of the public
domain, the government must step in to allocate entry into that medium.").
69. Stanzler, Cable Television Monopoly And The First Amendment, 4 CARDOZO
L. REV. 199, 223 (1983) (citing W. Baer, CABLE TELEVISION: A HANDBOOK FOR DECI-
SIONMAKING 15 (1974)). "Coaxial cable" is the name of a type of cable that cable sys-
tems utilize. It "consists of a small diameter inner conductor, a larger diameter outer
conductor, a plastic foam to keep them apart and to maintain an electric field between
them, and an outer sheath to protect the entire cable from the weather or whatever
else might affect the operation of the system." ALFRED P. SLOAN FOUNDATION, ON
THE CABLE 12 (1971).
70. While utility poles and conduits can be enlarged, new frequencies cannot be
constructed, at least to the extent that the government confines broadcasting to a
certain spectrum. The government could, however, "construct" more frequencies by
enlarging that confinement. To do so, though, would illuminate another circularity
on which broadcast regulation is based, that is, if radiowave scarcity is attributable to
government restrictions rather than the physical limitations of the spectrum, can the
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led one commentator to suggest that "the possibility of such a
shortage [of space] seems to have been overstated."'" More-
over, the possible future substitution of fiberoptics,72 which
carry many more signals but have a smaller diameter than co-
axial cable, makes a true shortage of space appear even more
remote. However, even where a utility pole or conduit could
not accept another cable, the cable operator could either en-
large the utility pole or conduit or he could reroute the cable
around the obstacle. In such a situation, the impediment to the
operator would not be a physical limitation but rather an eco-
nomic limitation. The operator would be constrained only
where he found it uneconomical to bypass the obstacle. In ef-
fect, then, medium scarcity is a function of economic scarcity
which, as discussed below,73 is not constitutionally sufficient to
support regulations that bar prospective cable operators from a
city. Therefore, even in the unlikely situation where there is
not sufficient space on public utility poles and conduits, pro-
spective operators cannot be constitutionally excluded.
Second, there is no possibility of frequency interference.
Each "frequency" is sent via its own channel within the coaxial
cable. 4 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that cable's
purported medium scarcity is not analogous to broadcasting's
radiowave scarcity and thus is not a sufficient basis for regula-
tion is sound.75
government use a self-induced scarcity to support an asserted right to regulate based
on that scarcity? This question, however, is beyond the scope of this commentary.
71. Stanzler, supra note 69, at 223.
72. Fiberoptics are "thin fiber[s] of very pure glass highly transparent, used for
transmitting information by means of light." CABLE TV RENEWALS & REFRANCHIS-
ING 202 (J. Rice ed. 1983).
73. See infra notes 76-136 and accompanying text.
74. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-45 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("The First
Amendment theory espoused in National Broadcasting Co. and reaffirmed in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. cannot be directly applied to cable television since an essential
precondition of that theory-physical interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring
role for government-is absent. Interference among speakers on a single cable is con-
trolled by electrical equipment which divides the cable into channels and by the own-
ers of the cable system who determine who shall have access to each channel and for
how long.") (citation ommitted). See also Stanzler, note 69, at 213-17.
75. Under the facts of Preferred, the Ninth Circuit was not required to address
the situation where utility poles and conduits did not have available space, and ex-
pressly declined to do so. Los Angeles simply alleged that "available space on such
facilities is to an undetermined extent physically limited ...... Preferred I, 754 F.2d at
1404. The holding in this decision, however, should be the same regardless of whether
or not an area's utility poles and conduits have physical room to allow an additional
cable. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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2. Economic Scarcity
The Ninth Circuit next addressed the city's assertion that,
because cable is a natural monopoly,7 6 the attendant economic
scarcity justifies government regulation. Despite finding it un-
necessary to decide the issue,77 the court confronted the argu-
ment in dicta.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged several cases which held
that the economic scarcity caused by cable's purported natural
monopoly characteristics provide a basis for some regulation;
78
however, it found the reasoning unpersuasive.79 As discussed
below, the argument that cable is a natural monopoly and that
this therefore justifies regulation can be attacked on two gen-
eral grounds. First, the support offered to prove that cable is a
natural monopoly is not compelling. Second, the question of
whether or not cable is a natural monopoly is irrelevant be-
cause economic scarcity is not sufficient to support regulation
that intrudes into cable operators' first amendment rights.
B. Is Cable A Natural Monopoly?
Cable regulation proponents maintain that cable is a natural
76. A natural monopoly is an "extreme example of economies of scale.., which
occurs when a firm's costs decline as output increases all the way to the market's
saturation point." H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 31
(1985).
77. The court found it unnecessary to decide the issue because the city only made
a general allegation that economic scarcity exists in cable markets without alleging
that such scarcity existed in the South Central District of Los Angeles and because, as
a procedural matter, Preferred's material allegation had to be accepted as true. Pre-
ferred I, 754 F.2d at 1404. It is likely that the court decided to address the argument in
dicta because it is one of the strongest arguments cable regulation proponents offer.
78. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1405 (citing Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981) (economic scarcity due to natural monop-
olistic traits coupled with cable's disruptive use of the public domain justifies some
degree of regulation); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 571 F. Supp.
976, 985-86 (D.R.I. 1983) ("Cable operators often compete for a cable franchise but
very rarely develop competing cable systems for the same service area. Such a
franchising system recognizes the economic realities of the cable industry, which, as a
practical matter, create a 'natural monopoly'...." Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 986);
Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127-28 (7th Cir. 1982)
(finding that since the biggest cost of a cable system is its "grid," and the cost of ad-
ding subscribers is relatively small, the average cost per subscriber would be mini-
mized by having a single company in any given geographical area, thus resulting in a
natural monopoly); Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F.
Supp. 543, 547 (W.D.Ky. 1982) ("A Cable television system, by nature, tends to be a
natural monopoly.").
79. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1405-06. For a discussion why the court and the author
find the reasoning unpersuasive, see infra notes 80-136 and accompanying text.
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monopoly because of the huge initial investment that compa-
nies must make to buy equipment and wire the streets of a
given region.80 Once this initial "grid" is constructed, the incre-
mental cost to add a subscriber is minute.8' Thus, to spread the
cost of the grid out and achieve the lowest possible cost per sub-
scriber, cable companies strive to monopolize the market. If
another company enters, then there are fewer subscribers per
system and those fewer subscribers must support the cost of
the grid, a cost which remains relatively constant. Therefore,
the subscription price to subscribers must increase as the
number of companies who enter the market increases. This
creates a situation where a market is unable to produce suffi-
cient revenues to financially support an additional cable com-
pany. It is this "economic scarcity" that proponents claim is
analogous to broadcasting's radiowave scarcity and justifies
cable regulation.
The support offered to prove that cable is a natural monopoly
is not compelling for two reasons: first, it relies on circular
logic, and; second, the claim assumes that there are no substi-
tutes for cable, ignoring competitive sevices.
First, circular logic is frequently used to support the conten-
tion that cable is a natural monopoly. In essence, the argument
points to the lack of competing cable systems as proof that the
huge initial investment and attendant economic scarcity makes
cable a monopoly. 2 This lack of competition, however, appears
80. See Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable Television Operator: An
Unprotective Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 1, 4-5
(1981) ("In suburbs where cables can be strung overground on existing utility and
telephone poles, the cost can range from $4,500 to $14,000 a mile. If the cables must be
laid underground, the cost is far higher. While in sparsely populated areas it might
cost less than $10,000 a mile to put down underground cable, in the heavily populated
urban areas the cost can be $25,000 to $50,000 or more. In parts of San Francisco, for
example, it costs $100,000 a mile to put in the cables while avoiding the city's sewer
system.") (footnotes omitted).
81. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (finding that the biggest cost of a cable system is its "grid,"
and the cost of adding subscribers probably is relatively small); Meyerson, supra note
80, at 5 ("The marginal cost attributable to any additional subscriber is relatively
small.") (footnote omitted).
82. The sole proof that the NLC [National League of Cities, a proponent of
cable regulation,] offers to support its position that cable is a natural monop-
oly is the claim that competition between two operators for the same sub-
scribers occurs in only eight of the more than 6,000 cable systems in
operation.




to be attributable to cities granting exclusive franchises or re-
fusing to license more than one franchise rather than to a cable
operator's ability to exclude competition. 3 Thus, the argument
is circular because cities are attempting to use the city-created
lack of competition to justify their anticompetitive regulations
and policies.
Moreover, regardless of the extent to which cable may dis-
courage entry by other cable operators due to the huge initial
investment required, 4 it appears this is again largely the result
of city regulations.8 5 For example, the Ninth Circuit described
Los Angeles' requirements:
A potential bidder must pay a $10,000 filing fee and a $500
good faith deposit and must agree to pay up to an additional
$60,000 to reimburse the City for expenses incurred in holding
the auction.... The City also requires hopeful bidders to agree
to pay the City a percentage of future annual gross revenues
and to provide a variety of customer services, including at least
52 channels of video service and interactive (two way) service.
More significantly, the City exacts a commitment to provide
various mandatory access and leased access channels. Bidders
must agree to provide, without compensation, two channels for
83. See id. at 885 n.68.
Monopoly power is the power to exclude competition when a firm desires.
For cities to advance this as a rationale for regulation seems strange because
they generally have excluded cable competition by not franchising more than
one firm. The unwillingness of cable firms, however, to enter into competi-
tion with an existing cable system does not demonstrate the existing firm's
monopoly power. A city will find it difficult to get a cable firm that is not
granted a de facto exclusive franchise to agree to provide extensive nonreve-
nue-producing services and to subject itself to extensive regulatory controls.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Stanzler, supra note 70, at 199-200.
Cable television has developed as a local monopoly. It is the general practice
to award only one cable television franchise in a given geographic (sic] area.
The typical franchise, moreover, implicitly or explicitly precludes any rival
cable operators from doing business in the same area. Hence, the number of
communities served by more than one cable operator is exceedingly small.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see Miller & Beals, supra note 52, at 95.
Although a cable operator rarely holds an exclusive franchise, competition
between two systems in the same area is practically nonexistent. In only
about six of more than 6,000 cable systems in the United States does one
operator compete with another operator for the same subscribers. Once a
system is built, a second operator normally will not build a separate system to
serve the same subscribers because of the economics of cable.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
84. See supra notes 80 & 81 and accompanying text.
85. For a good theoretical discussion on why cable is a natural monopoly see Note,
Hit or Myth?: The Cable TV Marketplace, Diversity and Regulation, 35 FED. COMM.
L.J. 41, 61-66 (1983).
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use by the City and by other government entities, two channels
for use by educational institutions, and two channels for use by
the general public, along with staff and facilities to aid in pro-
gramming. Bidders must further agree to provide two leased
access channels as well. An undertaking to provide portable
production facilities and to permit free use by the City of all
poles, towers, ducts, and antennas is also required. 6
Without regulations requiring expensive access channels, stu-
dios, large channel capacities, and short renewal periods which
force operators to recover expenses in a shorter time than they
would in an open market, costs would be considerably lower
and entry easier.
8 7
Cable regulation proponents, such as the National League of
Cities (NLC), however, offer additional support for their con-
tention that cable is a natural monopoly" by citing an FCC
study. 9 This study found that 40 to 45 percent of homes which
had an opportunity to subscribe to cable actually subscribed.9"
This rate, the study claimed, is only about ten percent higher
than the cable operator's financial break-even point.91 The
NLC and other proponents claim that this statistic shows that
another cable operator cannot enter the same market and
make a profit, thus making cable a natural monopoly. Given
the circumstances described in the FCC study (namely, that
there is a ten percent margin for profitability) and assuming
that cable penetration will halt at the 40 to 45 percent level, the
FCC impliedly established that 30 to 35 percent of a market
86. Preferred 1, 754 F.2d at 1400-01.
87. See Kelley, Cable television unshackled? The courts have just struck a blow
for freedom of speech, Barrons, Apr. 22, 1985, at 9, col. 2:
Judgments about the feasibility of competition reflect historical costs,
which include those imposed by municipal regulation: fancy hardware,
franchise fees, public-access channels and studios. These account for at least
20% of total costs, and a recent study by National Economic Research Associ-
ates Inc. suggests that they may run as high as 30%.
Id. The Cable Communications Policy Act set a ceiling of 5% of cable revenues as the
municipality's fee "which many fear will become the floor." Id. If only administrative
costs were allowed it would be "a figure well under the 5% of revenues that is usually
exacted." Id. at 9, col. 3. Moreover, "if cities cannot deny renewal, firms will not need
to recover their investments within the 15-year franchise period, and costs could drop
further." Id. See text accompanying note 121 (describing various conditions that a
potential cable operator must meet to obtain a franchise in Los Angeles).
88. Miller & Beals, supra note 52, at 85 n.* & 95 n.43.
89. Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and
Cable Television, Report and Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980).
90. Id. para. 65 at 686.
91. Id. para. 63 at 686.
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must subscribe before a cable operator will break even.92 How-
ever, if cable operators were not forced to construct these ex-
pensive systems9 3 and franchise fees were reduced to cover only
administrative costs, then the break-even point would be re-
duced by between 20 to 30 percent.9 4 In other words, the break-
even point would be only 70 to 80 percent of the current break-
even point described in the FCC study. Decreasing the break-
even point by this amount means that, theoretically, cable oper-
ators need only wire 21 to 28 percent of a market to survive in a
deregulated environment.95 Therefore, even if cable penetra-
tion stops at the 40 to 45 percent level, two systems may well
compete in a market.96 Further,
the FCC qualified the statistic [that at the forty to forty-five
percent level there is only a ten percent margin for profitabil-
ity] with the statement that the agency could not precisely
measure the extent to which pay cable will affect the growth of
demand for cable television service. [T]o the extent that pay
cable adds to the profits of cable systems, break even points
will tend to decrease.
9 7
In this light, the proof offered by regulation proponents is
insufficient to support the claim that a second cable operator
cannot enter a market and that cable is therefore a natural
monopoly.
The second flaw in the argument that cable is a natural mo-
nopoly is the assumption that cable has no substitutes and
therefore no competition. By focusing on whether more than
one cable operator can effectively compete in a market, propo-
92. See id. at paras. 60-63 at 684-86. The low and high estimates of the break-even
point can be calculated from the report as follows: Low-end estimate: 40% (of an
area's households that subscribe), less 10% (profit margin), equals 30% (of an area's
households). High-end estimate: 45% (of an area's households that subscribe), less
10% (profit margin), equals 35% (of an area's households).
93. See supra notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text.
94. See Kelley, supra note 87.
95. The new low and high break-even estimates can be calculated as follows: New
low-end estimate: 30% (old low-end break-even point) x 70% (the liberal estimate
that the break-even point would be reduced by 30%) equals 21%. New high-end
break-even estimate: 35% (old high-end break-even point) x 80% (the conservative
estimate that the break-even point would be reduced by 20%) equals 28%.
96. However, according to a July, 1986 A.C. Nielsen report, 47.8% of the nation's
households now have cable. Broadcasting, Aug. 25, 1986, at 10, col. 3. Therefore, it is
even more likely that two cable systems could compete if the break-even point is be-
tween 21% and 28%.
97. Lee, supra note 82, at 881 (footnotes omitted). "Pay Cable" refers to premium
services like Home Box Office for which there is an additional charge over the basic
cable subscription fee.
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nents of the natural monopoly argument assume that cable is a
product which has no substitutes. In other words, proponents
apparently believe that subscribers cannot get audio, video, and
other services98 provided by a cable company from other media.
Accordingly, when a second cable company is excluded from
the market, the subscriber must turn to the original cable com-
pany to obtain these services. It is in this sense, proponents as-
sert, that a "monopoly" exists. This assumption, however, is
untenable.
Broadcast television is one substitute for a portion of cable's
services. The FCC has found that the demand for cable is pri-
marily determined by the quantity and quality of television sig-
nals available on the air in a given area.99 This indicates that
consumers view broadcast and cable television as largely inter-
changeable. In addition to broadcast television, Satellite
Master Antenna Television (SMATV), °° Multipoint Distribu-
tion Services (MDS),' 0° Subscription Television (STV), 0 2 Home
Video Cassette Recorders (VCRs), and movie theaters all pro-
vide substitute sources from which subscribers may receive
movies or other programming competitive with pay cable pro-
gramming. Furthermore, with the introduction of new tech-
nologies such as Low Power Television (LPTV) 0 3 and Direct
98. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
99. Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and
Cable Television, Report and Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, para. 61 at 685 (1980).
A large number of factors affect cable demand-including especially the
number and type of signals available over-the-air versus on cable, the recep-
tion quality of local signals, the subscription price, and the demographic char-
acteristics of the households offered the service. The extent to which these
factors affect the demand for cable television has been analyzed in detail in
five major econometric studies. These studies find that the quantity and re-
ception quality of the signals available over-the-air are key determinants of
cable penetration.
Id. (citations omitted.) See also Lee, supra note 82, at 886.
100. SMATV receives its programming, which may include the same fare as a cable
company, from satellites and then retransmits via cable to subscribers located in a
common building or complex. A common use of SMATV is in large apartment com-
plexes where the cable is strung to each apartment without using municipal ease-
ments. Such a use would exempt SMATV from municipal regulation. See CABLE TV
RENEWALS, supra note 40, at 200, 204.
101. MDS is basically television broadcasting that uses microwave frequencies. See
id. at 201.
102. STV uses a standard broadcast frequency over which operators send a scram-
bled signal. Typical programming includes recently released movies that directly
compete with pay cable. See id. at 205.
103. LPTV uses television broadcast frequencies, but at greatly reduced power.
See id. at 199. This enables more than one operator to use the same frequency, pro-
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Broadcast Satellites (DBS),'10 4 consumers will have still more
alternatives. Even those developing cable teletext services
such as shopping, banking, and voting that require two-way in-
teraction will find competition in services offered through
broadcast's one-way videotex when coupled with the tele-
phone's two-way capabilities. Finally, since only 48 percent of
households that have cable available actually subscribe, °5 cable
is not perceived as an essential source of programming or
teletext services. Aggregated, these facts indicate that cable
competes with substitute programming sources, thus under-
mining the claim that cable is a natural monopoly.
C. Does Natural Monopoly Status Justify Regulation?
Even if cable were a natural monopoly, it is irrelevant be-
cause, as discussed below, economic scarcity is not sufficient to
justify regulations which interfere with cable operators' edito-
rial functions.
To justify its cable franchise regulations, the City of Los An-
geles attempted to analogize economic scarcity to radiowave
scarcity. Assuming, arguendo, that cable is a natural monop-
oly, to justify the city's regulations, the City of Los Angeles still
had to distinguish the rule set forth in Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo.'06 Tornillo involved a suit by a candidate
for the Florida House of Representatives to compel the Miami
Herald to comply with Florida's "right of reply" statute and
print, free of charge, the candidate's reply to the newspaper's
editorial criticism of him. °7 The United States Supreme Court,
while noting that "the same economic factors which have
caused the disappearance of vast numbers of metropolitan
newspapers.., have made entry into the marketplace of ideas
vided that the operators are physically located far enough away from one another to
avoid signal interference. Therefore, more operators within a general geographic
market are theoretically able to voice their opinions and provide distinct program-
ming. To date, the FCC has licensed 3,420 LPTV stations and is aiming for 4,000.
Kelley, supra note 87, at 9, col. 2.
104. DBSs are more powerful than today's generation of satellites. With this in-
creased power, these satellites can send a signal to earth capable of being received by a
very small earth dish. See CABLE TV RENEWALS, supra note 40, at 191-92, 195. The
reduced size coupled with economies of scale are expected to reduce the cost enough
to make purchase attractive to individual households, which could then completely
bypass cable operators and receive the programming directly.
105. See supra note 94.
106. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
107. Id. at 244 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (West 1973)).
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served by the print media almost impossible,"' 8 held that "the
Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amend-
ment because of its intrusion into the function of editors."'' 0 9
Thus, economic scarcity is not sufficient to permit governmen-
tal interference "into the function of editors." Further, because
it is well settled that cable operators perform the functions of
editors,"0 Tornillo bars economic scarcity as a justification for
intruding into operators' editorial functions.
To determine whether Tornillo could be distinguished, the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged several cases, including Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,' which had at-
tempted to distance the Tornillo rule from cable to uphold
cable regulations. In Boulder, the court observed that Tornillo
involved an effort by state government to compel public access
to a medium that is not tied to government in the way cable
companies necessarily are .... It was in this context that the
[Tornillo] Court concluded 'economic scarcity,' without more,
could not overcome the First Amendment objection against re-
quiring a private newspaper to print what Florida's right-of-
reply statute dictated."
2
The Boulder court found two factors that when combined with
economic scarcity supported cable regulation. First, "[cable tel-
evision has] no tradition of nearly absolute freedom from gov-
ernment control." Second, and "[m]ost importantly, a cable
company must significantly impact the public domain in order
to operate .... "I The Ninth Circuit then examined these two
bases for distinguishing Tornillo to determine whether such
distinctions are valid and, therefore, whether economic scarcity
justifies cable regulation.
108. Id. at 251 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 258.
110. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979) ("Cable operators
now share with broadcasters a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding
what their programming will include. As the Commission, itself, has observed, 'both
in their signal carriage decisions and in connection with their origination function,
cable television systems are afforded considerable control over the content of the pro-
gramming they provide.' ") (quoting Nondiscrimination-CATV Employment Prac-
tices, Report and Order, 69 F.C.C.2d 1324, para. 16 at 1333 (1978)).
111. 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981).
112. Id. at 1379.
113. Id. The "significant impact on the public domain" and the "disruption of pub-
lic resources" that the Boulder and Preferred I courts discuss likely refer to the dis-
ruption of the flow of traffic and the inconvenience to the community which a cable
company causes while stringing cable on utility poles or digging up the road to lay
cable in underground conduits.
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The Ninth Circuit found the first basis of distinction inade-
quate because it "merely begs the question. ' 114 Clearly, to up-
hold current regulations because cable has no tradition of
regulatory freedom is to rely on another circular argument: be-
cause cable has been regulated, regulation is justified.
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the second basis of dis-
tinction was "too broad"1 5 because "[i]t suggests that simply
because cable's disruption of the public domain gives rise to a
need for licensing, it would also justify the monopoly the City
seeks to create by its auction process. 11 6 In support, the court
examined Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,"7 which held
that "the government has legitimate interests in controlling the
noncommunicative aspects [of speech],""' and United States v.
O'Brien,"9 which established the following test to measure the
reasonableness of regulations designed to protect those
interests:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest. 20
Because cities are using the disruption of public resources-a
noncommunicative aspect of cable operators' speech-as a basis
for regulation, cities must satisfy the O'Brien test by proving
the reasonableness of their regulations.' 2' The Ninth Circuit
noted that regulating the disruption of public resources is not
only constitutional under Metromedia, but it furthers the im-
portant governmental interests in "public safety and in main-
taining public thoroughfares. 122 The court was not, however,
"convinced that restricting the number of cable operators...
furthers these interests [which must be unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression] in a manner consistent with the
114. Preferred 1, 754 F.2d at 1405 n.8.
115. Id. at 1405.
116. Id.
117. 453 U.S. 490 (1977).
118. Id. at 502.
119. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
120. Id. at 377.
121. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1406 n.9.
122. Id. at 1405-06.
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First Amendment."' 23 In essence, the Ninth Circuit faulted the
city's franchising process because the city's restrictions on first
amendment freedoms were greater than were essential to re-
duce the disruption of public resources. The court implied that
to protect the city's interest, the city needed only to pass rea-
sonable time, place, and manner regulations which set forth
when, where, and how the streets may be dug up. To flatly pre-
clude all potential operators who missed the franchise auction
was more restrictive than necessary.
The Ninth Circuit further observed that
the means chosen by the City to serve its interests [in minimiz-
ing the disruption of the public domain]-allowing only the
single company selected through the franchise auction process
to erect and operate a cable system in each region-creates a
serious risk that city officials will discriminate among cable
providers on the basis of the content of, or the views expressed
in, their proposed programs."'
It is clear from an examination of the City of Los Angeles'
franchise auction process that such a risk of discrimination ex-
ists. For a prospective cable operator to obtain a franchise in
the City of Los Angeles,
[i]t must provide the City with a detailed proposal outlining its
intended operations over the succeeding nine years and must
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the City that it has a "sound
financial base," that its proposed operations constitute "sound
business plans," and that it has the proper "character qualifica-
tions" and "demonstrated business experience"....
Finally, potential cable operators must agree to leave a vari-
ety of business decisions to the discretion of the City. Pricing
and customer relations are left to the City's control. The oper-
ator must form a "cable franchise advisory board," subject to
City approval. Lastly, the City reserves the right to inspect the
cable operation upon demand and requires a waiver of any
right to recover for damages or other injury arising from the
cable franchise or its enforcement.
After the submission of bids from companies willing to sub-
mit to the foregoing conditions, the City chooses the operator it
deems to be "best" for each area. It awards just one franchise
in each region.
1 25
123. Id. at 1406 n.9. ("There was nothing in the record on this issue." Therefore,
the court could not pass judgment, but could only remain "not convinced").
124. Id. at 1406.
125. Id. at 1400-01.
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While ostensibly objective, the franchising auction process
necessarily entails a subjective weighing of these factors.
There is no magical formula which will determine the best
applicant. Rather, the process calls on the decision-makers to
review, in light of their own values, each candidate's quali-
fications. It is this subjective balancing that creates a serious
risk of discrimination based on cable operators' views.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that economic
scarcity and disruption of the public domain are insufficient ba-
ses to regulate cable can be further supported. The Boulder
court distinguished the Tornillo finding that newspapers have a
long-standing tradition of being free from government control
and do not disrupt the public domain as does cable.126 However,
the Boulder court failed to explain how these distinctions jus-
tify the gamut of franchising regulations, including those re-
quiring access channels, rather than just reasonable time, place,
and manner regulations. Thus, by relying solely on the fact
that Tornillo can be distinguished to uphold regulations which
interfere with cable operators' editorial discretion and offering
no other explanation, the Boulder court reversed the presump-
tion which courts have relied on in deciding media freedom of
speech cases-that editors have complete editorial freedom, un-
less the specific situation dictates otherwise.127 Instead, the
Boulder court operated on the presumption that the editorial
function may be regulated, unless the specific situation is iden-
tical to Tornillo 28 By reversing the presumption that editors
have complete editorial control, the Boulder court's holding is
126. Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1379.
127. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("Because of
the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on
licensees .... "); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) ("[T]he burden of
proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the censor."); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (prohibiting prior restraint of the press, except in
exceptional situations); Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1048 (8th Cir.
1978). In Midwest the court stated:
Though [FCC's] counsel said the reason [underlying their requirement of
forced access to broadcast stations] lay in scarcity of broadcast frequencies, it
appears to have escaped Commission attention that it is the scarcity of broad-
cast signals that excuses its limited regulatory intrusion on First Amendment
and other rights of broadcasters. The Commission's notion that the absence
of scarcity in the potential number of cables removes the limits on its author-
ity has things backward. The absence of scarcity removes the excuse for
intrusion.
Id. (Emphasis in original).
128. Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1377-79.
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unjustifiable and antithetical to the first amendment goal of a
free press.
In Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke,129 another
court attempted to distinguish Tornillo on grounds different
from those relied on in Boulder. The Berkshire court focused
on the chilling effect that Florida's "right of reply" statute at
issue in Tornillo had on newspaper editors.130 The Tornillo
court had observed that
[t]he Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the con-
tent of a newspaper. The first phase of the penalty resulting
from the compelled printing of a reply is exacted in terms of
the cost in printing and composing time and materials and in
taking up space that could be devoted to other material the
newspaper may have preferred to print....
Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper
that published news or commentary arguably within the reach
of the right-of-access statute, editors might well conclude that
the safe course is to avoid controversy.
131
The Berkshire court argued that mandatory access channels3 2
free cable operators from the chilling effect triggered by carry-
ing controversial programming.1 33 The essence of the argu-
ment is that if cable operators are already providing access
channels at their own cost, they will not shy away from carry-
ing controversial programming because granting access to
members of the public to respond to programming will not in-
crease the operators' cost. Such persons would respond over
the access channels which the operators must financially sup-
port regardless of what programming the operators carry. In
other words, there is no additional cost to provide an individual
with access; correspondingly, there is no inducement to take
"the safe course" by avoiding controversy. 34 However, to use
129. 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983).
130. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
131. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-57.
132. Mandatory access channels are channels which cable operators are forced to
carry to provide the public with access, free of charge, to the cable system. See 47
U.S.C. §§ 522(13), 521 & 532 (1984).
133. Berkshire, 571 F. Supp. at 987-88.
134. Because the fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to present both sides
of every issue of public importance, broadcasters may choose to avoid cover-
age of controversial issues rather than be forced to devote considerable time
to opposition spokesmen. Mandatory access requirements, by contrast, do
not pose such a threat [that dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate]; they require only that all individuals be given an opportunity to air
their views on a first-come, first-served basis. Access requirements, there-
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mandatory access channels to circumvent the chilling effect
which "right of reply" access invokes is to obfuscate the goal of
Tornillo which was to prevent "intrusion into the function of
editors. ' 135 Clearly, to remove control of an operator's chan-
nels from the operator is to intrude into his editorial functions
and should be prohibited by Tornillo. Further, if the continu-
ous access afforded by mandatory access channels were a con-
stitutional means to remove the inducement to take the safe
course, it should logically apply equally well to newspapers.
But there is little doubt that requiring newspapers to devote a
column or an entire page in every issue to public access would
be struck down for violating the first amendment. The Berk-
shire court's attempt to distinguish Tornillo, then, is no
sounder than the Boulder court's attempt. Tornillo cannot be
distinguished from cable freedom-of-speech cases in general or
Preferred in particular. Therefore, Tornillo precludes using
economic scarcity as a basis for cable regulations which intrude
into operators' editorial functions.
In summary, analogizing broadcasting's radiowave scarcity to
cable's purported medium or economic scarcity cannot justify
intrusion on cable operators' editorial rights guaranteed by the
first amendment. Because more cables can be deployed or al-
ternative routes taken where utility poles and conduits cannot
be expanded, medium scarcity is not parallel to radiowave scar-
city. There is a total absence of frequency interference which is
a precondition of the radiowave scarcity rationale. Further, the
claim that economic scarcity exists and that cable is a natural
monopoly is speculative at best. Regardless, whether cable is a
natural monopoly is irrelevant. Tornillo, which held that eco-
nomic scarcity was an insufficient basis to support government
intrusion into the function of editors,136 cannot be logically dis-
tinguished from cable freedom-of-speech cases in general and
Preferred in particular because cable operators peiform the
fore, further, rather than inhibit, the presentation of important, controver-
sial issues.
Id. at 988 (citations and footnotes omitted).
135. The Tornillo court explained that
[e]ven if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compul-
sory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or opin-
ion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida [right-of-reply] statute fails to
clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the
function of editors.




function of editors. Further, disruption of public rights-of-way
is too narrow a basis to support intrusion into the function of
cable editors, and mandatory access channels still interfere
with operators' editorial functions. Finally, it is not necessary
to resolve the factual assertions of the parties in Preferred
before developing a legal standard to judge cable regulations.
The legal underpinnings fail to support the regulation of cable's
editorial functions.
D. Public Forum as a Check on Government Regulation
Based on the above analysis,137 the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the City of Los Angeles could not exclude cable companies
where the city has space available on public utility poles and
other public property.13 However, while the City of Los Ange-
les is prohibited from restricting access to the city to only one
cable operator where space is available, it is possible that the
City of Los Angeles could achieve the same result through the
"back door" provided by the public forum doctrine. Under this
doctrine, if utility poles are not traditional or designated public
forums1 39 for free speech, the city would not be obligated to
open these utility poles to prospective cable operators. The
City of Los Angeles could argue that it is not restricting access
to the city, only to its utility poles. Operators would then have
to obtain easements over thousands of privately owned parcels
of land. Since the failure to obtain just a few easements could
prevent an operator from wiring an entire neighborhood or re-
gion, such a barrier is insurmountable and tantamount to
prohibiting access to the city. Perhaps fearing this approach,
the court addressed the public forum doctrine to reinforce its
holding.14 °
The court acknowledged that "'the First Amendment does
not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or
controlled by the government,' "141 but that the nature and
character of the property determine the right of access and the
scope of limitations that municipalities may impose.142 To rein-
137. See supra notes 56-136 and accompanying text.
138. Preferred 1, 754 F.2d at 1411.
139. See infra note 142.
140. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1407-09.
141. Id. at 1407 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981)).
142. Id. at 1407 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 44 (1983)). Perry classified public forums into three categories: (1) traditional pub-
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force its conclusion that cable operators should have access to
public utility poles and conduits and that disruption of the pub-
lic domain did not justify a total ban on additional cable sys-
tems, the Ninth Circuit had to distinguish Members of City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent.143 Vincent held that utility
poles were not traditional or designated public forums for post-
ing signs, and that the City of Los Angeles' aesthetic interest in
eliminating visual clutter was sufficient to support a content-
neutral total ban on such signs.1 44 The Ninth Circuit agreed
with the court in Grayned v. City of Rockford145 that "'[t]he
crucial question [is not whether public property is a traditional
or designated public forum but] is whether the manner of ex-
pression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time.' ",146 The Ninth Circuit
thus first distinguished Preferred from Vincent by noting that
carrying cable is "basically compatible" with the normal use of
utility poles of carrying phone and electricity lines.1 47 There-
lic forums, which are "places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate ... ." (2) designated public forums, which are public
property that the government has opened for use; and (3) non-public forums, which
are public property that the government has not dedicated to open communication.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. In the traditional public forum, "government may not pro-
hibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it
must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id. at 45 (citations omitted). In the desig-
nated public forum, "[r]easonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissi-
ble, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a
compelling state interest." Id. at 46 (citation omitted). In the non-public forum, "[i]n
addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for
its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. (citation omitted).
143. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
144. Id. at 814-15, 817.
145. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
146. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1407 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116).
147. Id. at 1408. In Vincent, however, "it [was] the tangible medium of expressing
the message [by posting signs on utility poles] that [had] the adverse impact on the
appearance of the landscape." Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810. The Ninth Circuit also noted
that "[t]he State of California has dedicated 'surplus space' on public utility structures
for use by cable television companies," thus creating a dedicated public forum. Pre-
ferred I, 754 F.2d at 1409. The court relied on CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 767.5(b) (West
Supp. 1984):
The Legislature finds and declares that public utilities have dedicated a
portion of such support structures to cable television corporations for pole
attachments in that public utilities have made available, through a course of
conduct covering many years, surplus space and excess capacity on and in
their support structures for use by cable television corporations for pole at-
tachments, and that the provision by such public utilities of surplus space and
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fore, the court stated that "while a flat ban on sign posting may
constitute a narrowly tailored measure to promote the City's
interest in eliminating visual clutter, banning the installation
of cable is not necessarily an appropriate way to further the
City's interest in minimizing disruption of the public
domain."'48
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning can be extended. A total ban
on additional cable systems to protect a city's aesthetic interest
is also not appropriate. It is not likely that adding a few addi-
tional cables to utility poles would diminish the aesthetic qual-
ity of those poles. Nor is it likely that cables would accumulate
to an extent that they could significantly impact aesthetic qual-
ity; economics would likely restrict the number before the util-
ity poles were noticeably burdened. Moreover, this interest
would not be applicable to unseen underground conduits.
Thus, if a city's aesthetic interest is impinged it is by the con-
struction of the mode of communication. Except for periodic
repair work, a city's aesthetic interest is not impinged once the
cable system has been deployed. To protect its aesthetic inter-
ests during construction and repair, a city could pass reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations that could reduce any vis-
ual blight by limiting the number of construction sites and by
limiting the time of construction to when people would be less
likely to see the construction. It is clear, then, that a flat ban
on additional cable systems restricts first amendment freedoms
in a manner greater than is essential to further a city's aes-
thetic interest, just as a flat ban to protect a city's interest in
minimizing the disruption of the public domain is greater than
essential to protect that interest. Therefore, a total ban on ad-
ditional cable systems to protect a city's aesthetic interest vio-
lates the O'Brien test and is unconstitutional.'49
The Ninth Circuit then distinguished Vincent by observing
that in Vincent the ban was total whereas in Preferred the ban
excluded all cable operators except the one selected by the city.
This, as the Ninth Circuit stated, "creates an impermissible risk
excess capacity for such pole attachments is a public utility service delivered
by public utilities to cable television corporations.
The Legislature further finds and declares that it is in the interests of the
people of California for public utilities to continue to make available such
surplus space and excess capacity for use by cable television corporations.
Id.
148. Preferred I, 754 F.2d at 1408 (citations omitted).
149. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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of covert discrimination. ' 150 Moreover, the court held that this
risk of covert discrimination is sufficient to prevent the city
from excluding additional cable operators even if utility poles
and conduits do not constitute public forums for cable
transmission.15'
In addition to the court's distinctions, there is at least one
other basis for distinguishing Vincent from Preferred. In Vin-
cent, Vincent could have communicated via alternative modes
of communication, including distributing literature "in the
same place" as the utility poles. 52 In the Preferred setting,
however, the alternative modes of communication are inade-
quate. 153 This may, in itself, render invalid an otherwise valid
restriction.'
In summary, the facts of Vincent are inapposite to the facts
of Preferred. Vincent is neither precedent for excluding cable
operators from utility poles because such poles are not tradi-
tional or designated public forums nor is it precedent for a con-
tent-neutral total ban of cable systems to protect a city's
aesthetic interest.
E. Mandatory and Leased Access Channels as Alternative Means
of Communication
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit addressed a related but peripheral
argument. The California cities of Palo Alto, Menlo Park, and
Atherton, in an amicus brief, asserted that the mandatory and
leased access channels the franchisee is required to maintain
provide alternative avenues of communication. 55 Such alter-
native avenues of communication, amici suggested, ensure that
there is no first amendment restriction on cable operators who
are denied franchises.
56
Amici contended that Preferred's ability to use the fran-
chisee's access channels would enable Preferred to disseminate
150. Preferred 1, 754 F.2d at 1409.
151. Id.
152. See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.
153. A cable operator could conceivably distribute its programming via MDS or
DBS, but it is highly unlikely that such communication could be distributed "in the
same place" as was possible in Vincent. See supra notes 101 & 104 and accompanying
text.
154. See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.




its messages without becoming a franchisee.'57 The Ninth Cir-
cuit summarily rejected this argument, stating metaphorically
that, "[a] law allowing free expression in public parks only for a
few minutes at 6 a.m. hardly provides an adequate replacement
for the right to free, untrammeled debate in that forum.'
158
Moreover, while an otherwise valid restriction may be ren-
dered invalid if the remaining modes of communication are in-
adequate, the reverse is not true. An otherwise invalid
restriction is not made valid by the availability of other avenues
of expression.'59 This logic is sound. Undoubtedly, Preferred
would be as successful in disseminating all its intended pro-
gramming over another's mandatory and leased access chan-
nels as the editors of the Los Angeles Times would be in
running the content of their newspaper in the Los Angeles Her-
ald's editorial page.
V
Implications of the Ninth Circuit's Opinion
As discussed above, the Supreme Court did not adopt or re-
ject the legal standard the Ninth Circuit relied on. The
Supreme Court simply held that the first amendment applies to
cable and remanded the case to resolve the factual assertions of
the parties.1 60 However, if the Supreme Court eventually
adopts the legal standard the Ninth Circuit relied on, namely
that Tornillo, rather than Red Lion or Vincent, controls the
disposition of Preferred,'6' then there will be several immediate
effects.
A. The Franchising Process
Some of the first effects will be in the franchising process.
The Ninth Circuit's explicit holding in Preferred is that
franchising authorities will no longer be able to exclude addi-
tional cable operators where there is space available on public
rights-of-way.'6 2 Implicit within this holding, however, are at
least three necessary conclusions.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1410.
159. Id.
160. Preferred II, - U.S. at -, 106 S. Ct. at 2037, 2038.
161. See Preferred 1, 754 F.2d at 1404, 1405, 1408.




The first conclusion is that cable access requirements violate
the first amendment. Prior to Preferred, municipalities justi-
fied their requirement of public and leased access on economic
and/or medium scarcity analogies to broadcasting's radiowave
scarcity. However, Preferred rejected these analogies, 16 3 as
well as foreclosed the possibility that a city may deny cable op-
erators access to public utility poles and conduits by claiming
those rights-of-way are not traditional or designated public fo-
rums. 6 4 The result is that all but reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations exceed O'Brien's directive that incidental
restrictions of first amendment freedoms can be no greater
than are essential to the furtherance of the government's inter-
ests, specifically in minimizing disruption of public resources
and in reducing visual clutter.165 Therefore, because access
channel requirements go beyond reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations, they violate the first amendment rights of
cable operators.
2. Franchise Fees
The second conclusion is that franchise fees will be limited to
the actual cost of administering reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations. Under section 622(b) of the Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984,166 municipalities are authorized
to extract a franchise fee of up to five percent of a cable opera-
tor's gross revenues. However, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,6 7
the Supreme Court declared that "[a] state may not impose a
charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal
Constitution.' 1 68 Moreover, Murdock "held that fees imposed
by the government upon those exercising First Amendment
rights to use public property under the public forum doctrine
are limited to 'nominal fee[s] imposed as a regulatory measure
to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question.' "9169
Therefore, because Preferred concluded that the first amend-
ment grants cable operators the right to access a city's public
163. See supra notes 56-136 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 137-54 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
166. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1984).
167. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
168. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113. See also CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at 203 n.7.
169. CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at 203-04 (quoting Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113-14).
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rights-of-way where there is available space,... and affirmed
that "[p]ublic property,.., which is neither a traditional nor a
designated public forum, can still serve as a forum for First
Amendment expression... when the expression is appropriate
for the forum,"' 71 a city may not extract payment "greater than
the actual cost of regulation."' 72
3. Franchise Renewals
The third conclusion is that there will be no set franchising
periods and thus no franchising renewal. Because municipali-
ties have no authority under Preferred to exclude cable opera-
tors, with the possible exception where their utility poles and
conduits have no available space,173 there can be no renewal pe-
riod. In other words, without the power to terminate a cable
franchise or exclude operators from obtaining one, there can be
no initial or renewal period.
B. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
In addition to those effects in the franchising process, Pre-
ferred will also impact the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984. Preferred's holding that a municipality cannot limit ac-
cess to a given region where the public utility facilities have
available space necessarily invalidates section 621(a)(1) of the
CCPA, which states that "[a] franchising authority may award,
in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter, 1 or more
franchises within its jurisdiction.'
74
Moreover, because Preferred invalidates access require-
ments, 75 it also invalidates section 611 of the CCPA, which em-
powers franchise authorities to designate channels for public,
educational, or governmental use,17 6 and section 612 of the
CCPA, which empowers franchise authorities to designate
channels for commercial use.
77
Lastly, as discussed above, franchise fees can no longer ex-
170. Preferred 1, 754 F.2d at 1411.
171. Id. at 1408 (quoting Gannett Satellite Information Network v. Metropolitan
Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1984)).
172. See CABLESPEECH, supra note 13, at 204.
173. See supra notes 73 & 75 and accompanying text.
174. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1984).
175. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
176. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1984).
177. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1984).
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ceed the actual cost of regulation. 7 ' Therefore, to the extent
that the authorized five percent of a cable operator's gross reve-
nues exceeds the actual cost of regulation, section 622(b) of the
CCPA7 9 violates the first amendment rights of cable operators.
VI
Conclusion
Although the Supreme Court remanded Preferred for the
district court to resolve the factual assertions of the parties, the
Supreme Court could have disposed of the case by analyzing
the legal underpinnings of cable regulation. Such an analysis
would support the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that those bases
justifying broadcast regulation do not apply to cable regulation.
Thus, while resolving the factual assertions of the parties may
be necessary to determine the full extent of reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations and to determine how strong the
city's interests are in aesthetics and controlling disruption of
the public domain, both of which are pertinent for a public fo-
rum evaluation, a factual resolution is not necessary to deter-
mine which legal standard should be applied to challenged
cable regulations.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court declined to estab-
lish the first amendment standard for cable. Instead, the split
among the circuits continues. Nevertheless, it is likely that
cable operators and perhaps broadcasters will welcome Pre-
ferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles as an im-
portant case reaffirming that cable is entitled to first
amendment protection, and as another step toward broader
free speech rights.
178. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
179. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (1984).
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